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For more than a century, the use of mineral resources has increased exponentially with annual growth
percentages of between 4% and 6%. While for most mineral resources, depletion is not an issue, for some
mineral resources the current level of extraction is likely to pose a problem for future generations. De-
pletion of a mineral resource means that its enriched deposits will have been extracted, and conse-
quently it will become much more expensive for future generations to continue to use these minerals.
While technology may reduce some of the adverse effects of depletion, future generations may be de-
prived of potential innovations for which these speciﬁc materials would be essential. The question arises
as to how the currently unsustainable extraction of mineral resources can be decreased to safeguard
them for future generations. It is submitted that it is unlikely that market forces alone will sufﬁciently
impact the prices of minerals to resolve the unsustainable use of certain minerals timely enough. In this
article, it is posited that an international agreement on the conversation and sustainable use of geolo-
gically scarce minerals is necessary. The agreement will recognize that the geological scarcity of mineral
resources differs between different minerals. It will therefore make a selection of priority minerals,
determine how far the extraction rate of these substances must be reduced and decide on a ﬁxed time
period within which the extraction must decrease from the current rate to a sustainable rate. The design
of such an agreement will be based on two basic principles contained in existing international en-
vironmental agreements: (1) the inter-generational equity principle and (2) the principle of conservation
of natural resources. Furthermore, the obligatory reduction of the extraction of mineral resources will
affect the sovereign rights of resource countries to exploit their own resources. Therefore, any interna-
tional agreement should make arrangements to ensure resource countries are adequately compensated
for their loss of income.
& 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
For more than a century, the use of mineral resources has in-
creased exponentially with annual growth percentages of between
4% and 6%. A mineral resource is a concentration of naturally oc-
curring solid, liquid or gaseous material in or on the Earth's crust,
in such form and amount that economic extraction of a com-
modity from the concentration is currently or potentially feasible
(Craig et al., 1988, p 20). Table 1 provides the annual increase of
the extraction of a number of minerals. The growth is caused by ar Ltd. This is an open access article
s Institute of Sustainable De-
etherlands.
M. Henckens).
ation has been funded by the
ting Grant Scheme (Proposal
cientiﬁc Research under thecombination of population growth and economic growth per ca-
pita (see Fig. 1).
The population data until 1950 is from United Nations (1999),
the population data since 1950 is from United Nations (2015), the
GDP data until 1969 is from Maddison (2010) and the GDP data
from 1970 is from the United Nations Statistics Division (2014).
The GDP data is based on 2005 US$.
The question arises whether current levels of extraction of
certain mineral resources will result in a problem for future gen-
erations and what measures, if any, humanity should take to re-
duce current levels of extraction of the scarcest mineral resources
to safeguard them for future generations.
The goal of the present paper is to discuss the necessity of an
international agreement on the conversation and sustainable use
of geologically scarce mineral resources and the possible design of
such an agreement.
Discussions on the geological scarcity of mineral resources and
the consequences of unsustainable use are nothing new. Section 2under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Table 1
Historical growth rates of the extraction of several important mineral resources (United States Geological Survey, 2015).
Molybdenum (%) Chromium (%) Nickel (%) Copper (%) Zinc (%) Lead (%) Tin (%) Grand average (%)
Average growth of the world extraction 1900–2013 16.5 7.6 7.3 3.9 3.5 2.8 1.9 6.2
Average growth of the world extraction 1950–2013 6.0 4.9 4.5 3.5 3.4 2.3 1.2 3.7
Average growth of the world extraction 2000–2013 5.4 5.3 3.3 2.6 3.9 4.4 1.8 3.8
Fig. 1. Development of world population and global GDP between 1800 and 2010.
M.L.C.M. Henckens et al. / Resources Policy 49 (2016) 92–101 93will provide a brief overview of the debate between the so-called
resource pessimists and the resource optimists, and it will provide
an operational starting point of what could be a “sustainable ex-
traction rate” of mineral resources. Section 3 will examine the role
that an international agreement on the conservation and sus-
tainable use of geologically scarce mineral resources could serve,
identifying key objectives. Section 4 outlines which policy in-
struments are adequate to implement these objectives. Section 5
will look at the set-up and principles in an international agree-
ment. Section 6 will look at the ﬁnancial mechanisms that can
support the realization of objectives. Section 7 will provide an
overview of the core elements of an international agreement on
the conservation and sustainable use of geologically scarce mineral
resources. Section 8 will provide recommendations on further
research. Finally, the Supplementary data include a draft frame-
work agreement on the conservation and sustainable use of geo-
logically scarce mineral resources.2. Geological scarcity of mineral resources and sustainable
extraction
Malthus (1798) predicted that continuous population growth
could outpace the production capacity of fertile land, which would
then lead to massive starvation by hunger, epidemic diseases and
wars for resources. The only solution, as he saw it, was to limit the
number of children in poor families. Later, Malthus’ pessimistic
view on the limited resources for an increasing world population
was followed by inﬂuential essays from Ricardo (1817) and Mill
(1848). Ricardo includes minerals scarcity in his publication as a
limiting factor for population growth. Mill, however, recognizes
the possibilities of new technology for increasing the productivity
of exploiting land and other resources and thus sustaining a
growing world population.
By the end of the 19th century there was a broad concern about
resource availability, especially in the USA. This was reﬂected by
the so-called Conservation Movement that was active between
1890 and 1920 (Tilton, 2001). The origin of the concern about
scarce resources was especially connected to the fast in-
dustrialization and the development of vast wild lands. This
Conservation Movement, of which President Theodore Roosevelt
was one of the prominent members and supporters, promoted thewise use of resources. This entailed using renewable resources
instead of nonrenewable resources, more abundant nonrenewable
resources instead of less abundant nonrenewable resources and
recycled products instead of primary resources (Tilton, 2001).
After World War II, new concerns on the long-run availability of
resources were raised in connection with the substantial resource
use related to postwar reconstruction. In the USA, this led in 1952
to the creation of the President's Material Policy Commission (or
Paley Commission, after its chairman). One of the consequences of
the work of this Commission was the sponsoring of organizations
and studies on growth and scarcity.
A very inﬂuential book within this framework was published by
Barnett and Morse (1963). Their ﬁndings and views on the re-
lationship between economic growth and depletion of non-
renewable resources stood in sharp contrast with those held
previously. The opinion of Barnett and Morse is that technological
developments have completely compensated for increasingly
scarce, nonrenewable resources and can be expected to do so in
future as well. The strong potential of technology development to
solve scarcity problems was also emphasized in books by Maurice
and Smithson (1984) and Diamandis and Kotler (2012). In 1979, a
number of scientists reconsidered and nuanced Barnett and Mor-
se's optimistic vision presenting a spectrum of different views on
the subject of minerals’ scarcity (Smith, 1979). In 1972, contra-
dicting Barnett and Morse, Meadows et al. published Limits to
Growth for the so-called Club of Rome, coming to the conclusion
that per capita food and industrial output would collapse as a
result of exhaustion of mineral resources and environmental de-
gradation (Meadows et al., 1972). In 1992, Meadows and his co-
authors updated their advice to the Club of Rome (Meadows et al.,
1992), basically conﬁrming their original point of view. The above
described differences of view on scarcity reﬂect the discussion
between the so-called resource optimists and resource pessimists.
The resource pessimists support the so-called ﬁxed stock para-
digm. The Earth is ﬁnite, and so the amount of mineral resources is
ﬁnite as well. However, demand will not stop growing so it is only
a matter of time before supply cannot meet demand anymore.
Resource pessimists include Meadows et al. (1972, 1992), Kesler
(1994), Diederen (2009) and Bardi (2013), amongst others.
On the other hand, the resource optimists support the so-called
opportunity-cost paradigm. The optimists do not deny that mi-
neral resources will deplete gradually, but they have a strong belief
that humanity will be able to cope with the effects of depletion.
When demand outpaces supply, the costs will rise and – si-
multaneously – the pressure to ﬁnd substitutes or alternatives for
the depleted mineral. According to the resource optimists, the
market will automatically solve the problem. Moreover, mostly –
and unlike oil, natural gas and coal – mineral resources are not
destroyed by using them. Recycling and reuse are possible. Finally,
the total geological stock is enormous. It will always be possible to
extract minerals, although the costs will be considerable. Resource
optimists are for instance Hodges (1995), Gunn (2011), Simon
(1980, 1981), Adelman (1990) and Beckerman (1995), Maurice and
Smithson (1984), Diamandis and Kotler (2012) and Lomborg
(2001).
The point of view of the resource optimists is shared by econ-
omists such as e.g., Goodland (1995), Perman et al. (2003),
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1974b). They ﬁnd that future exhaustion of mineral resources is
not problematic per se, as long as the decreasing natural capital of
depleting mineral resources is sufﬁciently replaced by increasing
human capital, such as knowledge, infrastructure and adequate
substitutes. Gaudet (2007) and Hotelling (1931) have the opinion
that non-renewable resources must be “optimally” depleted. On
the other hand, the view of the resource pessimists is supported
by the International Law Association (2014) stating that future
generations may have a legitimate expectation of equitable access
to planetary resources.
Both resource pessimists and resource optimists acknowledge
that mineral resources are exhaustible. The difference between
them is that the optimists trust that humankind will ﬁnd a timely
solution by replacing scarce resources with substitutes. The pes-
simists, on the other hand, are of the opinion that humanity
should not deliberately deprive future generations from scarce
resources, regardless of whether they could be replaced by alter-
native resources. In the view of the authors, the optimistic and
pessimistic visions are not mutually exclusive but are in fact re-
concilable; humanity will be able to resolve mineral depletion
problems, e.g. by replacement of scarce resources and by in-
creasing recycling, but it is also the case that the current genera-
tion should not take away geologically scarce resources from fu-
ture generations.
Hence it is essential that minerals are extracted in a sustainable
manner. In order to ensure this, a sustainable extraction rate must
be determined. An important question, in this respect, is how large
the Extractable Global Resources of a given mineral are. According
to the UNEP International Panel on Sustainable Resource Man-
agement (2011, page 1), the “Extractable Global Resources are the
amount of a given metal in ore that is judged to be extractable over
the long term.” According to Skinner (1976), the upper limit of the
extractable global resources would be 0.01% of the total amount of
a mineral in the crust. Erickson (1973) and Rankin (2011) also use
0.01% of the total amount of a metal in the crust for estimates of
the extractable deposits. In line with these authors, the UNEP In-
ternational Panel on Sustainable Resource Management believes
that an amount of 0.01% of the total amount available in the crust
to 1 km depth is not an unreasonable upper limit of the Ex-
tractable Global Resources (EGR) of a mineral (UNEP, 2011, p 21
and 24).
According to calculations of the UNEP International Panel on
Sustainable Resource Management, the EGR estimate of 0.01% of
the amount in the upper 1 km of the Earth's crust is, on average,
35 times as high as the latest “reserve base” ﬁgures of the United
States Geological Survey (USGS). The reserve base (RB) is deﬁned as
the part of an identiﬁed resource that meets speciﬁc minimum
physical and chemical criteria related to current mining and pro-
duction practices, including those for grade, quality, thickness and
depth. USGS used to provide reserve base ﬁgures until this service
was stopped in 2009. Reserves are that part of the reserve base
that could be economically extracted or produced at the time of
determination. Because the average EGR/RB ratio is 35, the authors
of the present paper feel conﬁdent that the UNEP estimate of the
extractable quantity of mineral resources is not unnecessarily
alarming. Therefore, the UNEP approach is adopted in the frame-
work of the elaboration of an operational deﬁnition of sustainable
extraction.
It ought to be noted that, after the depletion of an extractable
mineral resource, 99.99% of that mineral still remains in the
Earth's crust. However its extraction will be much more expensive
than the extraction of the enriched top 0.01%. Enrichment factors
of geologically scarce mineral resources are 100 s to 1000 s of
times the average concentration of the mineral in the Earth's crust
(Rankin, 2011). Hence, the extraction of a mineral resource fromnormal rocks will be 100 s to 1000 s of times more expensive than
for the enriched ores of that mineral (Steen and Borg, 2002).
Once the extractable quantity of a mineral resource is de-
termined, it is essential to choose a basis from which to determine
whether the extraction rate of a mineral is sustainable. An ex-
traction rate is considered sustainable “if a world population of
9 billion people can be provided with the resource for a period of at
least 1000 years assuming that the average per capita consumption of
the mineral is equally divided over the world's countries” (Henckens
et al., 2014). The assumption is made that the minimum conditions
for an operational deﬁnition of sustainable extraction ought to
take account of: (1) the long term continuity of delivery of the
resource for a price that is in the same order of magnitude of the
price that the current generation pays for the resource, (2) inter-
and intra-generational equity and (3) knowledge on the amount of
extractable global resources. 1000 years will be sufﬁcient for hu-
mankind to organize a circular economy, in which the extraction of
minerals from the Earth's crust will be minimal and sufﬁcient
resources are left for later generations. An order of magnitude
smaller period (i.e. 100 years) would allow depleting certain mi-
neral resources within a relatively short period of time depriving
our grandchildren from those resources and without being certain
that humanity is able to prepare for a fully circular economy so
fast. On the other hand, a period of 10,000 years seems un-
necessarily long. A population of 9 billion people has been used in
the deﬁnition because, according to United Nations Statistics Di-
vision (2014) – estimates at the time of publication of the deﬁni-
tion – the expected world population in 2050 would be 9 billion
and would be more or less stable from then on (United Nations,
2011). Of course, a higher world population makes the depletion
issue more urgent.
After analyzing the geological scarcity of 65 minerals – mainly
metals and metalloids (Henckens et al., 2014) – it was concluded
that the extractable global resources of 15 of these minerals will be
depleted within about 350 years, with ﬁve due to be depleted
within 100 years. Although for many mineral resources depletion
is not imminent, for some minerals it is relatively nearby. Table 2
presents these 15 elements in order of geological scarcity. The
mineral resources are subdivided in four groups according to their
geological scarcity: (a) Very scarce, (b) Scarce, (c) Moderately
scarce, and (d) Not scarce.
It should be noted that Table 2 may not be exhaustive. Only 65
minerals were included in the investigation. The selection has
been derived from the work of the UNEP International Resource
Panel on Sustainable Resource Management (2011). In the ela-
boration of an agreement on the conservation and sustainable use
of geologically scarce mineral resources, all mineral resources need
to be taken into consideration.3. Objectives of an international agreement on the conserva-
tion and sustainable use of geologically scarce mineral
resources
For a number of minerals, depletion of ores is relatively nearby,
and a substantial extraction reduction is needed to make the use of
these minerals sustainable. Therefore, it could be considered wise
to create an international agreement on the conservation and
sustainable use of geologically scarce mineral resources. The
question arises why there has not been a similar urgency in the
negotiation of an international agreement in response to the de-
pletion of minerals as there has been with environmental issues
such as biodiversity and climate change. The explanation might be
that mineral resource depletion does not directly co-determine the
“safe operating space for humanity” (terminology from Rockström
et al., 2009), but it is primarily an economic problem (with the
Table 2
Remaining years until depletion of 15 elements in a business-as-usual scenario (3% growth until 2050, where after stabilization). Necessary extraction reduction compared to
the extraction in 2010 and to the estimated extraction in 2050 (Henckens et al., 2014).
Element Remaining years after
2050 until depletion
Grouping according to
geological scarcity
Necessary extraction reduction for
average world citizen compared to
2010 extraction (%)
Necessary extraction reduction for average world ci-
tizen compared to extraction in 2050 after 3% annual
growth between 2010 and 2050 (%)
Antimony 9 Very scarce 96 99
Gold 6 Scarce 92 98
Zinc 50 Scarce 82 95
Molybdenum 50 Scarce 81 94
Rhenium 80 Scarce 74 92
Copper 120 Moderately scarce 63 89
Chromium 150 Moderately scarce 57 87
Bismuth 160 Moderately scarce 55 86
Boron 200 Moderately scarce 44 83
Tin 230 Moderately scarce 35 80
Silver 240 Moderately scarce 33 80
Lead 250 Moderately scarce 30 79
Nickel 320 Moderately scarce 12 73
Iron 330 Moderately scarce 11 73
Tungsten 330 Moderately scarce 10 73
M.L.C.M. Henckens et al. / Resources Policy 49 (2016) 92–101 95exception of mineral resources that are essential for life, such as
phosphate). Nevertheless, this economic problem may become
serious for future generations, if no action is taken. Once the ores
of a mineral are depleted, extraction of this mineral from the
Earth's crust will become 10–1000 times more expensive (Steen
and Borg, 2002).
One could argue that the price mechanism of the free market
system could lead automatically to a sufﬁcient reduction of the use
of geologically scarce mineral resources due to the inevitable price
increase which results from growing scarcity (Dasgupta and Heal,
1979). However, so far, the increasing costs of extraction due to
declining ore grades, increasing depths of the mines, more remote
mining areas and smaller ore bodies, were neutralized by im-
proving technology (Skinner, 2001; Bardi, 2013; Bleichwitz, 2010).
For a long period of time the real prices of minerals have not in-
creased. Moreover, according to USGS data (2015), the price de-
velopment of geologically scarce minerals does not differ from the
price development of geologically non-scarce minerals (Henckens
et al., 2016c). The conclusion that real prices are not changing is
supported by Krautkraemer (1998), Cuddington (2010) and Fer-
nandez (2012). The market does not yet reﬂect the large differ-
ences of geological scarcity of mineral resources. It remains un-
clear how closely before depletion of a mineral resource the
market will react on geological scarcity by structural and perma-
nent price increases of the depleting mineral. It remains also un-
clear whether, at the near-depletion-stage, technological devel-
opment will be able, again, to keep prices down at the same level
as nowadays. It is also referred to the essay of Tilton (2003) in this
respect. Summarizing, it is not certain whether or not the geolo-
gically scarcest mineral resources will be sufﬁciently saved for
future generations, if humanity does not take measures to slow
down the extraction of the geologically scarcest mineral resources.
It is for these reasons that an international agreement is pro-
posed with the objective to achieve a situation of sustainable ex-
traction and to equitably distribute geologically scarce mineral
resources between the current and the future generations at the
lowest cost. This section will discuss how this objective can be
translated in concrete, implementable goals. Henckens et al. (2014)
have elaborated what their deﬁnition of sustainable extraction of
mineral resources would imply for 15 geologically scarce minerals
(see Table 2 above). Comparing the two right columns of Table 2,
the conclusion is that the longer humankind waits with starting-
up extraction reduction, the more drastic the required extraction
reduction will need to be; the sooner action is taken, the more
gradual the necessary change can be.Hence, based on the considerations in Section 2, the objectives
of an international agreement on the conservation and sustainable
use of geologically scarce mineral resources must address: (1) the
selection of minerals for which extraction reduction should be
made a priority, (2) the sustainable extraction rate, including the
required extraction reduction and the required time span within
which the required extraction reduction of the selected priority
minerals must take place and (3) the division of the extraction
reduction over the various mineral producing countries. This will
be elaborated in the following sub-sections.
3.1. Selection of priority mineral resources
In order to determine those minerals for which the reduction of
the extraction rate is a priority, it is obvious to select the scarcest
minerals as priority minerals: antimony, gold, molybdenum, rhe-
nium and zinc which, according to our estimate, will be depleted
within about 100 years. Indeed, geological scarcity is an important
criterion because the essential purpose of the agreement is to
ensure that future generations are not deprived scarce natural
resources. Other selection criteria could be relevant such as: the
extent that a mineral is critical for our society, its economic im-
portance, the stability of its delivery, its substitutability and its
recycling potential. For an overview of criticality criteria, reference
is made to an overview of criteria that have been used in 15 dif-
ferent criticality studies (Achzet and Helbig, 2013).
Elements which are essential for life and which cannot be
substituted by other elements may need priority compared to
elements which are not essential for life, for instance minerals
used in fertilizer and micronutrients. Of the elements in Table 2,
this concerns boron, molybdenum and zinc. In this framework, the
exhaustion of phosphate, though not included in Table 2, will
certainly need special attention as well. The majority of antimony's
applications are in ﬂame retardants. Hence, although antimony is a
very scarce element, it can be relatively easily be substituted by
other ﬂame retardant systems. Molybdenum, on the other hand, is
essential for the production of stainless steel and thus far, mo-
lybdenum seems to be hardly substitutable in this application.
Therefore, even though molybdenum is less scarce than antimony,
it may get more priority in view of a sustainable extraction than
antimony (Henckens et al., 2016d, 2016b).
Another factor is the relative economic importance of an ele-
ment for society in general or for speciﬁc countries. This depends
on the strategic value of the applications. The overall weighing of
these various factors is subjective and is inﬂuenced by the
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will necessarily be a political process. The political and societal
insights with respect to priority setting of the minerals for ex-
traction reduction may change over time. Therefore, an interna-
tional agreement on the conservation and sustainable use of
geologically scarce mineral resources will need to incorporate a
priority setting procedure. Due to the potentially changing nature
of the priority setting and the notoriously difﬁcult processes in-
volved in adopting amendments to treaties, the details of such a
procedure are best elaborated in a separate protocol to ensure that
it can be more easily altered to adapt to new realities.
3.2. Extraction reduction goal and phasing down scheme
How fast must, or can, the required extraction reduction take
place? The answer depends on how fast society can change to
production of substituting products, more material efﬁciency and a
higher recycling rate without too much destruction of capital.
Looking to history, relevant data may be derived from the phasing
out of ozone depleting substances, the phasing out of asbestos, the
ban of the use of certain chemicals in certain applications (e.g.
PCBs and cadmium), the transition to cleaner and more econom-
ical cars, the emission reduction of greenhouse gasses and the
emission reduction of acidifying air pollutants (e.g. SO2 and NOx).
Without going into too much detail, one can say that a phasing
down period will be in the order of 5–10 years, at a minimum.
Determining factors are the time needed for the technical devel-
opment of suitable substitutes and recycling technologies, plus the
time needed to realize the necessary industrial facilities. Private
companies must get sufﬁcient time to amortize existing facilities
in order to prevent too much ﬁnancial loss. The feasibility of a
phasing down scheme needs to be separately assessed for each
selected mineral. Because phasing down schemes are speciﬁc and
may differ per mineral, these schemes should be elaborated in a
separate protocol per mineral. This will need to be reﬂected in any
framework agreement.
3.3. Allocation of annual extraction quota of priority minerals to
resource countries
For the minerals that are selected for extraction reduction, the
capped annual quantities that may be extracted will need to be
allocated between the resource countries. The extraction reduction
must – over a number of years – gradually arrive at the agreed
level of sustainable extraction. For example, it is agreed that the
extraction of a certain mineral resource must be reduced by 80%
over a period of 10 years in steps of 8% of the original extraction.
Assume that at the beginning there are 3 resource countries: A, B
and C. The (known) reserves of the resource are respectively RA, RB
and RC, and their average annual extraction rates during the last x
years are EA, EB and EC. It appears obvious to allocate the extraction
quota according to the known reserves in the resource countries.
This starting point results in the following allocation AAx to
country A in year x after the start of the extraction quota program:
( ) ( )= ( − ) * * + + + +R E E R RA 1 0.08x E / R ,Ax A A B C A B C
Now assume, new reserves are found in country D and country
D decides to exploit the resource from year 8. In this case, the
amount allocated to country D (AD) in year 8 is equal to:
( )
( )
+ +
+ + +
R E E E
R R R R
0.36 D A B C
A B C D
The globally agreed extraction reduction must go on, irre-
spective of the discovery of new reserves. This is necessary be-
cause the global extraction reduction scheme has already takeninto account that most of the extractable resources have not yet
been discovered (Henckens et al., 2014). That means that the quota
of mineral extraction that have been allocated to the countries A, B
and C will need to decrease proportionally to the new resource
allocation to country D. 10% extra allocation to country D means
10% less allocation to the countries A, B and C.
To prevent the allocation system from being too restrictive, it
must allow resource countries to trade within the allocated quotas.
By allowing trading of allocated extraction quota, several objec-
tives are achieved simultaneously: (1) ﬂexibility of the system,
(2) the ﬁnal objectives are maintained and (3) extraction will take
place in countries and mines with the lowest extraction costs. If
resource country A cannot deliver, e.g. due to accidents, strikes or
geopolitical events, then the other resource countries may be al-
lowed to buy the extraction quota allocated to country A. Country
A is allowed to buy back the quota again later on.
Extraction allocation pro rata of proven reserves is a rational
approach, but other criteria might be taken into consideration as
well, such as production capacity, historical production share,
domestic consumption, production costs, dependence on export,
population and external debt (see e.g. the discussion within the
Organization of Oil Producing Countries (OPEC) on a quota system
for oil production (Sandrea, 2003)).
The extractable reserves need to be evaluated regularly to as-
sess whether these are still in accordance with the assumptions
that were at the basis of the extraction reduction scheme. This is
the task of a research body that must be installed as part of the
international agreement on the conservation and sustainable use
of geologically scarce mineral resources. The principle of annual
extraction quota per resource country and the tradability of ex-
traction quota amongst resource countries needs to be included in
the framework agreement. The elaboration of the system requires
further research and can be part of a separate protocol. In this
framework the experience with existing quota systems, such as
the OPEC system of quota for oil production, the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) CO2 emis-
sion quota system, the emission trading arrangements in the fra-
mework of UNFCCC and the EU Emission Trading System, could
provide a useful starting point.4. Policy instruments for reducing the extraction of geologi-
cally scarce mineral resources
Once the geologically scarce mineral resources have been se-
lected and the extraction reduction goals have been determined,
technical measures must be deﬁned to achieve these goals. Gen-
erally, the technical measures that are taken are: (1) substitution
of the resource for another less scarce resource, (2) increasing
material efﬁciency and (3) more recycling. In other publications
the authors have demonstrated that the required reduction goals
are technically achievable, even if they are very ambitious
(Henckens et al., 2015, 2016d, 2016b). The question is which policy
instruments are most appropriate. It is generally accepted that
market oriented incentives are more efﬁcient than a command
and control approach which directly mandates what businesses or
individuals should or should not do (Vogler, 2010; Helm et al.,
2003; Europe Economics, 2008; Gerlagh and Van der Zwaan,
2006; Olmstead and Stavins, 2012; Molyneaux et al., 2010 and
Goulder and Parry, 2008). The major market oriented incentives
are taxing the production and/or use of geologically scarce mineral
resources and “cap and trade” systems.
Applied on resource extraction, a cap and trade system ﬁxes the
maximum amount that is allowed to be extracted, but it allows for
ﬂexibility in the pricing of the extracted resource. A tax system
ﬁxes the price of the extracted resource but leaves the extracted
M.L.C.M. Henckens et al. / Resources Policy 49 (2016) 92–101 97quantity uncertain. There is much literature comparing the two
systems with each other. This literature is mostly centered on the
merits of either system for Green House Gas emission reduction.
Criteria that are being used can be divided by the following three
dimensions (i.e. Konidari and Mavrakis, 2007; Mees et al., 2014)
– Performance (e.g. goal achievement, effectiveness etc.)
– Political acceptability (e.g. costs-efﬁciency, equity/fairness, ﬂex-
ibility, stringency for non-compliance, legal certainty/predict-
ability/credibility, transparency controversy etc.)
– Ease of implementation (e.g. feasibility, accountability, trans-
parency, complexity etc.)
Some authors come to the conclusion that cap and trade is
better (Murray et al., 2009; Keohane, 2009). According to other
authors taxing systems are better (Avi-Yonah and Uhlmann, 2009).
Several authors plea for hybrid systems, combining taxes and cap
and trade systems including price ﬂoors and price ceilings, bank-
ing and borrowing (Molyneaux et al., 2010; Mandell, 2008 and
Vogler, 2010). According to others (Goulder and Perry, 2008;
Goulder and Schein, 2013), no instrument is best along all criteria.
The conclusion is that a comparison of taxing systems and “cap
and trade” systems does not unambiguously lead to a clear con-
clusion that either of the two systems is better.
The present publication elaborates on a global cap and trade
system to achieve a sustainable extraction of geologically scarce
mineral resources. The argumentation for this choice is that cap
and trade offers greater certainty that the required extraction re-
duction is achieved. The cap and trade system is successfully ap-
plied in the framework of the US Acid Rain Program for the
emission reduction of Sulfur Dioxide, and it is also already being
applied at an international scale in the EU Emission Trading Sys-
tem for the reduction of the emission of greenhouse gases. Thus
far, taxing systems for environmental purposes are only employed
at a national scale.
Striving after a global cap and trade approach does not ne-
cessarily hamper or withhold concerned user countries to for-
mulate and implement their own resource saving policies in ad-
vance. This will have the advantage of offering ﬂexibility to States
as to which policies they pursue, such as policies based on taxing
or other instruments such as directly imposing or promoting
substitution of geologically scarce mineral resources in selected
applications and recycling and arranging (voluntary) agreements
with or between sectors of industry or society. To the extent that a
global cap and trade system would be implemented, such national
or regional fall back options may be loosened or abolished again,
may work in parallel or compliment a global regime.
Ideally, the approach for solving the problem of geologically
scarce mineral resources is global. Geological scarcity is not a local
or a regional problem; it is a problem of humanity as a whole,
particularly for future generations. However, the climate change
problem shows how difﬁcult and time-consuming it can be to
agree on a workable and practical solution that is acceptable for all
countries despite the fact that the technical pathways are known
and feasible. Nevertheless, a global approach is the ideal way to
safeguard geologically scarce mineral resources for future gen-
erations. In addition, countries and regions may decide to go faster
and implement unilateral measures to save geologically scarce
mineral resources in advance of a global agreement.
A practical argument in favor of a global approach is the role of
the resource countries. Without their cooperation, it will be very
difﬁcult or even impossible to substantially reduce the extraction
of geologically scarce resources within a limited period of time.
The system must include a mechanism that makes resource
countries wholeheartedly stand behind an agreed extraction re-
duction. If not, there is a serious risk that an extraction reductionthat is not supported by all resource countries leads to ﬂooding of
the market with scarce resources, decreasing their price and
frustrating the objectives of the agreement.5. Principles of an agreement on the conservation and sus-
tainable use of geologically scarce mineral resources
The objectives of the international agreement discussed in
section 4 refer to what Henckens et al. (2016a) would refer to as
“goal orientated principles” of international environmental agree-
ments. “Goal orientated principles” are the principles that are di-
rectly connected with the seriousness of the problem to be solved,
such as the principle of sustainable use of resources. These can be
distinguished from the “design oriented principles” of interna-
tional environmental agreements which are related to the archi-
tecture and execution of the agreement, such as the sovereign
right and equity principles (Henckens et al., 2016a). The present
section deals with these “design oriented principles”, hereinafter
referred to as “principles”.
Principles are preconditions of an agreement. Without ade-
quate principles accepted by the parties of the agreement, the
objectives of an agreement cannot be achieved. The aim of these
principles is to satisfactorily comply with the justiﬁed interests of
various partners of the agreement. Relevant principles for an
agreement on the conservation and sustainable use of geologically
scarce mineral resources are the sovereign right principle, the
common concern of mankind principle, ethical principles (intra-
generational equity, priority for the special situation and needs of
developing countries and fairness), responsibility assignment
principles (such as the common but differentiated responsibilities
principle) and the polluter pays principle (Henckens et al., 2016a).
Most of these principles relate to burden sharing in connection
with the agreement. The formulation and elaboration of these
principles is essentially a political process and can therefore end
up being a bottleneck of any agreement. The present section shall
elaborate on the compensation of resource countries and how to
address the special situation and needs of developing countries. In
the Supplementary Data background information is provided on
the “sovereign right” principle, the “common concern of mankind”
principle, the “common but differentiated responsibilities” princi-
ple and the “polluter pays” principle in relation with the issue of
depletion of geologically scarce mineral resources.
5.1. Compensation of resource countries and establishment of an
annually ﬁxed resource price
When a resource country loses sovereignty over certain por-
tions of its natural resources (and the related income) by being
obliged to reduce the extraction of these resources for the purpose
of serving a common concern of mankind, it should be compen-
sated. Compensation of resource countries is justiﬁed because not
only are their sovereign rights affected but also their income. The
price increase that is probably caused by the obligatory extraction
reduction of resources is not certain and may not be sufﬁcient to
compensate for the decreased production and export of resources.
Without a guaranteed compensation for lost income, there is a
substantial risk that resource countries may not want to partici-
pate in the international agreement, in which they play a crucial
role.
The compensation principle is already being brought in practice
in the UN REDD compensation programme on Reducing Emissions
from Deforestation and Forest Degradation which compensates
(developing) nations for not logging their forests. The compensa-
tion for extraction reduction of mineral resources is discounted in
an increased resource price. To compensate the resource countries,
Fig. 2. From extraction to distribution. A¼allocated amount of resources that may
be extracted by resource countries. D¼distributed amount of resources to user
countries.
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decrease of the extraction rate. Therefore, from the moment on
that extraction reduction is implemented, a resource tonnage price
needs to be ﬁxed annually, directly reﬂecting the imposed ex-
traction decrease.
The compensation of resource countries must be such that
their income with an agreement on the conservation and sus-
tainable use of geologically scarce resources is equal to their in-
come without such an agreement. A resource country should not
get more compensation than the income that it would have re-
ceived without international agreement. Corrections of the general
approach may be necessary because the reserves in a country may
be near to depletion. It is not necessary to compensate a country
for lost income when this country would not have had this income
anyway. The principle of the compensation mechanism needs to
be part of the framework agreement. The detailed elaboration of
the mechanism can be arranged in a separate protocol, since the
outcome will be partly the result of political negotiations and may
change over time.
5.2. Addressing the special situation and needs of developing
countries
The solution of the geological scarcity problem may encompass
substantial extra costs for all countries, including poor countries.
Increasing scarcity of mineral resources is mainly caused by de-
veloped countries. Developed countries were able to generate
welfare for their people and to build up a physical infrastructure
co-based on the massive extraction and use of mineral resources.
When limiting the further extraction of geologically scarce mineral
resources, developing countries would be confronted with sub-
stantially higher costs for these resources, even though they have
not yet been able to build up an infrastructure at the same level as
developed countries and the majority of people in their societies
have not yet been able to enjoy the services provided by these
resources to the same extent of a citizen of the average developed
country. It will be difﬁcult to expect that developing countries
would unconditionally agree with a system that leads to higher
costs for their inhabitants without considering that they are not
responsible for geological scarcity in the ﬁrst place. Moreover,
without the consent of these countries, an international agree-
ment on the conservation and sustainable use of geologically
scarce mineral resources cannot be globally ratiﬁed. This means
that the role and position of developing countries needs special
attention. The interest of the developing countries in this per-
spective is twofold: (a) that their access to geologically scarce
mineral resources remains attainable and (b) that the costs for
solving the scarcity problem are acceptable for the developing
countries from a historical perspective.
a. Equitable distribution of geologically scarce mineral resources
Geologically scarce mineral resources can be considered as part
of the “ecological space for humankind”. The right to equitably share
the ecological space of mankind can be considered a fundamental
human right (Hayward, 2006). From a certain point on, when a
resource becomes very scarce, it looks justiﬁed to take steps to
equitably share such a resource. There are several ways in which
geologically scarce mineral resources could be equitably dis-
tributed to countries, e.g.:
– Equal amount per capita
– Equal amount per unit of GDP
– Grandfathering: the distribution is based on the existing amount
of resource that is used in a country in a reference year
– Contraction and convergence: convergence from the status quoto equal per capita emission rights over an agreed period of time
– Contraction and convergence with accounting of past use, e.g.
from 1990. Countries that have used more than the global
average use per capita until an agreed moment in time have to
reduce their consumption by this amount in a later period
Pan et al. (2014) provide an overview of 20 alternative alloca-
tion schemes for CO2 emission rights which – in principle – are
also applicable for the ways in which geologically scarce mineral
resources can be distributed. The distribution system will be the
subject of bargaining during the genesis of the international
agreement. The agreed distribution system will be laid down in a
separate protocol.
b. Lower costs for developing countries
Each of the user countries – developed or developing – will pay
the same ﬁxed tonnage price for the amount of resources that is
distributed to it. This resource tonnage price is annually ﬁxed by
an international body in the framework of the agreement and is
universal for all countries. User countries will be allowed to trade
the allocated quota of mineral resources. They may sell the re-
source for a price that the market (usually mineral processing
companies) is prepared to pay. Because of the global extraction
reduction, scarcity is artiﬁcially increased during the phasing
down period. The market price of the resource, that the user
countries will be able to receive, will probably become higher than
the ﬁxed tonnage price that the user countries have paid. The
gross effect of this system will be that the costs of the proposed
system are relatively higher for countries with a high consumption
of the scarce material and relatively lower for countries with a low
consumption of the scarce material.
The per capita consumption of mineral resources is positively
related to GDP (Graedel and Cao, 2010). The per capita consump-
tion of mineral resources in developing countries is lower than the
per capita consumption of mineral resources in developed coun-
tries. With an equal amount per capita distribution system this
implies that – under the agreement – developing countries would
get more mineral resources distributed to them than they actually
use or need. This creates a net proﬁt for these countries, as is
demonstrated in detail in section 5 of the Supporting Material. In
this way, developing countries are compensated for the higher
costs of the services of the resource in the future and for their
contribution to saving of geologically scarce mineral resources
currently and in the past.
The extraction quota that are allocated to resources countries
must be distinguished from the distribution quota of extracted
resources that are allocated to user countries (see Fig. 2). In our
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is extracted by resource countries may be traded between resource
countries; the resources that are distributed to user countries after
extraction may be traded on the market.
Although geologically scarce mineral resources are equitably
distributed to countries, it will remain the sovereign right of each
country to determine how to manage the distribution of costs and
beneﬁts in its own country for its own citizens.Fig. 3. Physical mass ﬂows, administrative mass ﬂows and ﬁnancial ﬂows in the
context of the proposed international agreement on the conservation and sus-
tainable use of geologically scarce mineral resources.6. Costs of the agreement and ﬁnancial ﬂows
The costs of an international agreement on the conservation
and sustainable use of geologically scarce mineral resources can be
split up in three elements:
– The higher costs for substituents, increased recycling and better
material efﬁciency compared to the current situation and the
higher market price for the original resource. These costs will
vary per mineral resource and per application and it is not easy
to make a precise estimation of these costs in general. The op-
timal mix of substitution, material efﬁciency measures and re-
cycling will differ per resource and per application. Moreover
these costs will depend on the required reduction rate. The
lower the required reduction of the extraction rate of a primary
material is, the easier it will be to realize the necessary reduc-
tion of the use of that primary material and the less the market
price of the original material will increase. These types of costs
will be paid by the ultimate consumers of the products, within
which the scarce resources are included. This is fair, because in
this way the extra costs will be distributed according to the use
of the resource. The economical consumer will incur fewer costs
than the wasting consumer.
– The additional costs to compensate the resource countries for
their loss of income. These costs will be incurred by the user
countries and must be included in the annually ﬁxed tonnage
price that the user countries pay to the resource countries. The
annually ﬁxed tonnage price is paid to the administrative body
that is in charge of the execution of the agreement and trans-
ferred by the administrative body to the resource countries. In
return for the paid compensation costs, the user countries
should gradually and proportionally become owner of the saved
reserves. In this way, from a certain moment on, the remaining
reserves are owned by the user countries and compensation
does not need to be paid anymore.
– The costs for the international administrative bodies that will be
in charge of the implementation and monitoring of the agree-
ment. These are called the transaction costs. Usually these types
of costs will not be permitted to exceed some percent of the
total market value of the original amount of resources on an
annual basis. These costs must be shared by the user countries in
proportion to the amount of resource distributed to each of
them. These costs are paid together with the ﬁxed tonnage price
to the international body that is in charge with the execution of
the agreement.
The buyers (the processing industry) will pay the market price
to the user countries. However, it will be necessary to establish a
minimum for the market price for preventing the market price to
become lower than the annually ﬁxed tonnage price. The mini-
mum price should be equal to the annual ﬁxed tonnage price plus
the transaction costs. The purpose of setting a minimum price is to
ensure that a user country, whatever the market price will be, will
not suffer any costs if it sells any scarce resources that it received
through the distribution system.
The mechanism is presented is Fig. 3.7. Core elements of an international agreement on the con-
servation and use of geologically scarce mineral resources
The present paper examines the set-up of an International
Agreement on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Geologi-
cally Scarce Mineral Resources. The focus is on the objectives,
principles, set-up and mechanisms of the agreement.
7.1. Objectives
The objectives of an agreement on the conservation and sus-
tainable use of geologically scarce mineral resources are:
– The sustainable use of geologically scarce mineral resources
– Equitable distribution of geologically scarce mineral resources
between the current generation and future generations.
7.2. Principles
The principles, on which an agreement on the conservation and
sustainable use of geologically scarce mineral resources is based,
are:
– The sovereign right principle
– The concern to mankind principle
– Compensation of the resource countries for their willingness to
reduce the extraction of geologically scarce mineral resources
– Equitable distribution of geologically scarce mineral resources to
the world's countries
7.3. Set-up
The set-up is a cap and trade system and consists of:
– A priority setting methodology that results in a list of geologi-
cally scarce mineral resources, of which the extraction must be
reduced with priority
– A procedure for the determination of an extraction reduction
goal for the selected mineral resources and a phasing down
scheme
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mineral resources and the allocation of these quota to the re-
source countries
– A system of equitable distribution of geologically scarce mineral
resources to user countries for a ﬁxed price per ton
7.4. Financial mechanisms
The ﬁnancial mechanism of the proposed agreement consists
of:
– A system of comcser countries for reducing the extraction of
geologically scarce mineral resources.
– A system to annually ﬁx a resource price that includes the
compensation for the resource countries and the transaction
costs for the implementation of the international agreement
– A system that makes the user countries owner of the not ex-
tracted mineral resources to the extent that they have paid
compensation to the resource countries
– The right for the resource countries to trade the extraction quota
between the resource countries
– The right for the user countries to sell the distributed resources
on the free market
– An international body for the conservation and sustainable use
of geologically scarce resources that is responsible for the
transfer and appropriate administration of the necessary pay-
ments to the extraction countries, and for inspection, monitor-
ing, evaluation and research.
7.5. Protocols
For each of the above mentioned set-up elements and ﬁnancial
mechanisms, separate protocols will be needed to elaborate the
agreed systems
7.6. Institutional bodies
The following institutional bodies will need to be set-up:
a. Conference of Parties for international cooperation and deci-
sion taking
b. Secretariat
c. Administrative body for scientiﬁc and technological advice
d. Body on implementation, monitoring and evaluation
A draft of a framework Agreement on the Conservation and
Sustainable Use of Geologically Scarce Mineral Resources is in-
cluded in Section 6 of the Supplementary Data.8. Recommendations
In this paper the main lines of an international agreement on
the conservation and sustainable use of geologically scarce mineral
resources were laid out. The details of the proposed agreement
need further research. This concerns especially:
– The factors that (may) hamper the genesis of an international
agreement on the conservation and sustainable use of geologi-
cally scarce mineral resources and how these hampering factors
could be addressed.
– An analysis of the interests of various partners to the agreement
(resource countries and user countries, developed countries and
developing countries) and other stakeholders (mining compa-
nies, processing industry)
– How to deal with countries that do not ratify the agreement. Thedraft framework agreement in the supplementary data contains
a tentative article on this subject, but this approach needs more
research
– The methodologies for priority setting of geologically scarce
mineral resources for the determination of the extraction re-
duction goals and for the phasing down schemes
– The system for the allocation of annual extraction quota to re-
source countries
– The system of distribution of regulated mineral resources to user
countries
– The system of compensation of resource countries for their loss
of export opportunities. In this framework, existing compensa-
tion schemes, such as the REDD compensation scheme, need to
be evaluated.
– The set-up of a system of periodic evaluation of extractable re-
serves per resource country
– The ownership system of non-extracted resources
– The lessons that may be drawn from the creation, the im-
plementation and the execution of existing international en-
vironmental agreements and other relevant mechanisms, such
as existing quota systems (oil-OPEC, CO2-UNFCCC), emission
trading schemes (UNFCCC and EU RTS) and compensation
schemes (REDD)
– A study on how to harmonize an international agreement on the
conservation and sustainable use of geologically scarce re-
sources with existing WTO agreements.Appendix A. Supporting information
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found in
the online version at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2016.04.
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